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Logics of Freedom: Debating
Religious Freedom Laws and
Gay and Lesbian Rights
Emily Kazyak1, Kelsy Burke1, and Mathew Stange2

Abstract
In the wake of marriage equality for same-sex couples, many states have introduced and passed laws that provide
religious exemptions for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer)
persons. The authors use data from a general population survey of Nebraskans as a mixed-methods case study to
examine public opinion of religious freedom laws. Drawing on data from both closed-ended (n = 1,117) and openended (n = 838) questions, the authors show that opposition to religious freedom laws is quite high, as 64 percent
of respondents report that they oppose laws that would allow business owners to deny services to gay men and
lesbians. The authors outline how both sides rely on frameworks that are foundational to the American experience:
the protection of rights and the capitalist economy. The authors argue that these appeals to broad American values
underscore why these bills will continue to be introduced and seen as controversial despite low levels of support.
Keywords
public opinion, sexuality, LGBT rights, religious freedom
In December 2017, the US Supreme Court heard arguments
in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, a case that centers on a wedding cake baker
who refused to make a cake for a same-sex couple. The case
is one example of debates occurring across the country over
tensions between religious freedom and LGBTQ (lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights. In the wake of
marriage equality for same-sex couples, many states have
introduced and passed laws that provide “religious
exemptions” for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ1
persons. These laws allow individuals to make decisions in
their work environments that may violate civil rights laws
but that uphold their religious conviction that fundamentally
opposes nonheterosexual relationships and transgender identities. Although wedding-related services (such as wedding
cakes) have garnered the most media attention, the bills provide protection for religious exceptions in a wide range of
services. For instance, in Mississippi, mental health care

providers can refuse to treat LGBTQ people. In South
Dakota, North Dakota, and Michigan, employees in adoption
and foster care services can legally refuse to place children
with LGBTQ parents. In the first half of 2017, 93 anti-LGBT
bills were debated, 42 of which were religious exemption
laws, and 60 pro-LGBT bills were debated (American Civil
Liberties Union 2017).2 The prevalence of both religious
freedom bills and laws protecting LGBTQ people following
marriage equality underscores that these laws expose
2The American Civil Liberties Union defines pro-LGBT bills as
legislation that offers comprehensive or incomplete protection
from discrimination for sexual orientation and/or gender identity. It
identifies anti-LGBT bills as antitransgender (regulating single-sex
facility restrooms, identification documents, health care, and other);
First Amendment defense acts; religious freedom restoration acts;
religious exemptions related to health care access, adoption and
foster care, marriage-related exemptions, and other; and preventive
measures against nondiscrimination protection for LGBTQ people.
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1We

use the term LGBTQ when discussing religious freedom legislation to reflect the fact that these bills affect a range of nonheterosexual or nonbinary individuals. Given that the question from the
survey data we analyze refers to “gay men or lesbians,” we use the
phrase “gay men and lesbians” when discussing our findings.
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contemporary debates over freedom, as gay rights and religious rights are pitted against each other.
Public opinion polling about religious freedom laws, however, is limited. National surveys have found that the public is
more closely divided on religious freedom laws than current
public opinion about same-sex marriage, which is largely
affirming (McCarthy 2014, 2016, 2017; Silver 2013).
According to the Pew Research Center (2016a, 2016d),
Americans are less likely to oppose a same-sex couple’s right
to marry (37 percent) than to support laws that allow businesses to refuse to provide wedding-related services to samesex couples (48 percent) or that require transgender people to
use the public restroom that aligns with the gender they were
assigned at birth (46 percent). Data from a national survey
experiment further underscore the division, with 53 percent
supporting denial of services to a hypothetical gay couple
seeking wedding photography (Powell, Schnabel, and Apgar
2017). Missing from these data is an explanation of why individuals support or oppose religious freedom legislation.
In this study, we use data from a general population survey of Nebraskans as a mixed-methods case study to examine public opinion of religious freedom laws that directly
reference sexual minorities. We first analyze the percentages
of respondents who favored and opposed religious freedom
laws and how support for religious freedom laws differs
across demographic, political, and religious groups. We then
analyze respondents’ written explanations of why they favor
or oppose the rights of business owners to refuse service to
gay men and lesbians. Analysis of the open-ended survey
responses reveals that individual attitudes about religious
freedom issues do not neatly map onto past findings about
people’s attitudes toward same-sex sexuality or same-sex
marriage. Instead, individuals on both sides of the religious
freedom issue draw on similar logics to support their clashing views. On the basis of analysis of more than 800 openended responses, we find that respondents rely on similar
logics to justify their opinions: individual rights and the free
market. These frameworks are overlapping and represent
shared representations of American identity (Blair-Loy 2001;
Bonikowski 2017; Brubaker 2004). Yet they reveal how
respondents connect opposite viewpoints to widely shared
values and how religious freedom debates gain so much traction and tension in contemporary American politics.

Cultural Schemas: Rights and Free
Market
To analyze how people make sense of religious freedom laws
related to LGBTQ individuals, we draw on insights from cultural sociology that underscores the importance of shared
meaning and frameworks in social life (Hays 2000; Sewell
1999; Swidler 1986). In particular, we are interested in the
“cultural schemas” that guide how people respond to the
hypothetical scenario of a business owner serving (or not
serving) a gay or lesbian customer (Di Maggio 1997; Sewell
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2001). Cultural schemas refer to the “socially constructed
frameworks,” “shared, publicly available understandings”
(Blair-Loy 2001:689), or “overarching shared representations
of particular domains of social life” (Bonikowski 2017:9).
These schemas help organize information coherently and
guide interpretations and action. In this way, analyzing how
people explain their support for or opposition to religious
freedom legislation sheds lights on the cultural schemas surrounding some of the most salient values in contemporary
America: freedom, rights, capitalism, and diversity.
As we will describe, public support for the protection of
Christian business owners who refuse service to gays and
lesbians implicitly or explicitly rejects the notion that
inequalities related to sexual orientation (heterosexuality
privileged over nonheterosexuality) or religion (Christianity
privileged over secularism or other religions) are embedded
within American democracy. Yet importantly, scholars argue
that issues of power and inequality penetrate social ideologies, or “common sense,” that reflect only a dominant group’s
perspective (Bonilla Silva 2006; Duggan 2004; Levitsky
2014). For instance, scholars argue that the shared framework of the American dream and meritocracy masks how
class, race, and gender inequalities shape people’s opportunities (McNamee and Miller 2009). When making sense of
diversity, another cultural schema, Americans frame an individual’s unique identity as a positive aspect of a diverse society but downplay or disparage group-level differences, such
as those that harm communities of color and privilege majority-white communities (Bell and Hartmann 2007). A related
example is how many Americans, including some people of
color, share a “color-blind” understanding about race that is
based on white supremacy (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Identity
markers including race (white), religion (Christian), and sexuality (heterosexual) are salient in representations of who is
and is not American (Canaday 2009; Parker and Barreto
2013; Theiss-Morse 2009). Debates over religious freedom
laws directed toward gays and lesbians highlight current tensions related to whose freedom and rights should be protected, who is and is not in danger of being harmed, and how
best to remedy potential harms people may experience.
Our findings suggest that values related to “rights” and
the free market are the most salient shared frameworks or
schemas on both sides of this religious freedom debate. The
framework of rights is widespread in American public discourse, and the belief in the importance of rights is universally shared (Djupe et al., 2015). As people draw on rights
language, they make claims about how they and others
deserve to be treated in the public sphere (Harrington and
Yngvesson 1990; Jenness 1999; Minow 1987). Americans
assert the importance of both individual and group rights that
emerge from the Constitution yet can see these rights in tension with one another (Bumiller 1992; Scheingold 2004).
The shared framework or cultural schema of “rights” is so
salient in America that an appeal to “rights” is envisioned as
an appeal to a better society (Scheingold 2004). For instance,
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the civil rights movement advocated that all Americans,
including people of color, have the right to be free from discrimination, a framework that activists have worked to
extend to other groups, including gay and lesbians (Bernstein
2003; Skrentny 2002). Yet the use of “rights” is undertaken
by both political liberals and conservatives to bolster positions on a range of issues, including school choice, gun control, and abortion (Garnett and Garnett 2000; Jelen 2005;
Luker 1985). Indeed, conservatives opposed to the expansion of LGBTQ rights have argued that these are “special
rights” gays and lesbians do not deserve (Goldberg-Hiller
and Milner 2003; Stein 2001; Stone 2016).
Additionally, scholars note that neoliberal understandings
increasingly infuse how Americans make sense of social life,
including the views that the “free market” is paramount, and
government intervention should be limited (Amable 2011;
Brown 2006; Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is, in the words
of Lisa Duggan (2004:10), “a kind of ‘nonpolitics’”: an ideology that promotes what are assumed to be universal values
related to the spread of capitalism and the increase of wealth
across the globe. When applied to cultural issues, neoliberal
values minimize public demand for protective government
policies and instead privatize the role of social welfare, placing the burden on individuals and families (see also Levitsky
2014). Before turning to our analyses of how the cultural
schemas of “rights” and “free market” emerge as people
make sense of business owners’ serving gay and lesbian customers, we briefly outline the history of religious freedom
legislation and the current context of religious freedom legislation related to LGBTQ rights.

Legislating Religious Freedom
Since Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) in 1993, 25 states have enacted similar religious
freedom laws. Debates over many of the earliest religious
freedom laws included no mention of same-sex wedding
cakes. The RFRA was initially passed to overturn a Supreme
Court ruling (Employment Division v. Smith 1990) that determined that Native American employees did not have the constitutional right to smoke peyote as part of a religious
ceremony. The organizations originally supporting the passage of the RFRA included the American Civil Liberties
Union and moderate religious groups such as the American
Jewish Committee and the United Methodist Church
(Hamilton 2015). Many of the initial supporters of the RFRA
likely did not anticipate its effects. These include, according
to legal scholar Margaret Hamilton (2015:140), that religious
persons have “a significantly higher likelihood of success”
when claiming religious grounds for actions that may violate
the law.
The conflict over religious freedom and civil rights in the
workplace is not unique to LGBT politics. The federal Civil
Rights Act requires that employers accommodate religious
exemption requests as long as these requests do not cause
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“undue hardship” on employers. Definitions of “religious
freedom,” however, remain murky because “undue hardship” is a subjective measure. Recent court cases have
included a Muslim flight attendant who wishes to be exempt
from serving alcohol; postal workers who refused to process
draft registration forms on the grounds of religious pacifism;
and Christian nurses who refuse to wash instruments to prepare for abortion procedures (Volokh 2015). Historically,
religious groups attempted and failed to be exempt from laws
that prohibit racial discrimination (Minow 2007; Turley
2008). Bob Jones University, for example, lost its tax-exempt
status when it continued to prohibit interracial marriages
after Loving v. Virginia rejected this prohibition in 1967.
Religious groups have received some exemptions when it
comes to laws protecting gender discrimination. For example, if an unmarried female employee signs a declaration of
faith with a religious employer, she can be legally terminated
from employment if she becomes pregnant (Minow 2007).
Religious freedom laws offer a strategy in the current
moment for religious conservative political actors concerned
that the advancement of LGBTQ rights infringes on the rights
of religious conservatives (Corvino, Anderson, and Girgis
2017). Even though the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects
the freedom of religious expression, and most states do not
offer protection for LGBTQ rights (such as from housing or
employment discrimination), the RFRA and related state bills
provide a practical route by which individuals can use the
courts to make free exercise violation claims against the state
(Bridge 2014; Richardson 2015).3 One such law is Mississippi
House Bill 1523 (passed in April 2016 and implemented in
October 2017 after a series of court appeals), which protects
persons who have “the sincerely held religious belief” that
marriage “should be recognized as the union of one man and
one woman” to decide whether to provide services, including
housing and employment, to LGBTQ people. The law does
not protect religious freedom generally but specifically draws
from conservative Protestant beliefs to put forth specific regulations surrounding gender and sexuality. It defines, for
example, “a man” and “a woman,” according to law: “an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined
by anatomy and genetics at the time of birth.” Although the
RFRA as it was first enacted garnered a wide range of support
from liberal and conservative organizations alike, recent religious freedom legislation is explicitly a compendium to an
anti-LGBTQ and antiabortion political agenda connected to
the religious right (Hamilton 2015).
It has yet to be determined whether these refusals of services would be upheld in court, even if they may be protected by state law. State legislatures along with courts must
determine whether LGBT nondiscrimination laws must

3As of June 2017, there are 28 states with no employment or housing nondiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation or gender
identity (Movement Advancement Project 2017).
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offer religious exemptions and what those exemptions might
be. Legal scholars on both sides agree that any outcome signals the state’s moral position about gay and lesbian citizenship (Dent 2006; Feldblum 2008; Minow 2007).
Nondiscrimination laws signal that to not protect gays and
lesbians is morally wrong. Religious exemptions to these
laws, however, signal that the exclusion of gays and lesbians
is morally permissible. As Feldblum (2008) describes, “an
inevitable choice between liberties must come into play”
(p. 153). Although legal scholars have proposed various
solutions to this dilemma (see Dent 2006; Feldblum 2008;
Turley 2008; Wilson 2017) popular debates highlight only
this either/or position: protection of gays and lesbians at the
expense of religious conservatives or the protection of religious conservatives at the expense of gays and lesbians.

LGBTQ Rights in a Postmarriage
Context
Analyzing public opinion about legal protection for business
owners who refuse service to gay men and lesbians is also
instructive of how Americans make sense of LGBTQ rights.
Polling agencies and researchers have tracked Americans’ attitudes of laws and policies affecting LGBTQ individuals and
have shown large shifts in public opinion during the previous
decades. Across public opinion polls today, more Americans
support same-sex marriage than oppose it (McCarthy 2014,
2016, 2017; Pew Research Center 2014; Silver 2013).
Researchers have also found high levels of support for laws
protecting LGBTQ people from housing and job discrimination (Lax and Phillips 2009; Lewis and Rogers 1999; Powell
et al. 2010). Consistently, research shows that women, higher
educated people, nonreligious individuals, younger generations, and political liberals are more likely to support these
pro-LGBTQ policies than men, lower educated people, religious individuals, older generations, and political conservatives (Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005;
Lewis 2011; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson, Cadge, and
Harrison 2006; Pearl and Galupo 2007; Rowatt et al. 2009;
Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Swank, Woodford, and
Lim 2013; Whitehead 2010; Woodford et al. 2012).
Recent polls have found that Americans are divided over
the issues legislated by recent religious freedom bills depending on how the question is asked (Pew Research Center
2016d; Powell et al. 2017; Rasmussen 2015). Data from the
Pew Research Center (2016d) show that 52.32 percent of
respondents think that businesses providing wedding related
services, such as catering or flowers, should be allowed to
refuses services to same-sex couples. A similar number of
people (53 percent) surveyed in a national experimental survey reported that a photographer should have the right to
deny a same-sex couple’s request for wedding photography
(Powell et al. 2017). Yet a 2017 survey conducted by the
Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI; Cox and Jones
2017) found that only 32 percent of Americans believe that
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small businesses should be able to refuse to provide services
to gay and lesbian people on religious grounds. Another
national survey found that 65.5 percent of respondents supported “some religious freedom laws to protect individuals
with legitimate religious beliefs” but that 63 percent of those
respondents also agreed that “sometimes states do pass laws
designed to discriminate” (Jackson State University 2016).
Our work adds to the limited public opinion data on religious
freedom laws that reference sexual minorities and enriches
our understanding about how people justify their support or
opposition to these laws.

Nebraska: A Case Study
Although we do not claim our data are nationally generalizable, characteristics of Nebraska make our data instructive
for how Americans make sense of debates over religious
freedom legislation. First, although Nebraska is more politically conservative than the national average, the state is comparable with the rest of the nation when it comes to attitudes
about LGBTQ rights. Nebraska voters overwhelmingly supported a ban on same-sex marriage in a 2000 referendum
(Adam 2003; Rasmussen 2006), and the Republican Party,
which largely controls the state government, continues to
advocate for defining marriage as the union between one
man and one woman. Yet in the decade that followed the ban
on same-sex marriage, the flagship state university and some
school districts, hospitals, business, and city and county governments extended benefits to same-sex couples (Dejka
2013; Funk 2013; Glissmann 2013; Reed 2012). Moreover,
recent analyses indicate that the majority of Nebraskans support same-sex marriage and other LGBTQ rights and that
Nebraskans’ opinions mirror national public opinion on these
issues (Stange and Kazyak 2016).
Additionally, Nebraska is fairly average when it comes to
measures of religiosity. A Pew Research Center (2014) study
ranks it the 22nd most religious state, on the basis of the percentage of residents who say that religion is very important in
their lives (54 percent), that they attend worship services
weekly (39 percent), that they pray daily (52 percent), and
that they believe in God with certainty (69 percent). It is neither highly religious like states in the South (Mississippi and
Alabama are tied for the most religious) nor highly secular
like states in the Northeast (New Hampshire and Massachusetts
are tied for least religious). Moreover, religious affiliations in
the state are comparable with those in the rest of the nation.
Seventy-five percent of Nebraska residents identify as
Christian, compared with 71 percent of Americans overall.
White evangelical Protestants, who often lead efforts to pass
religious liberty legislation and who are more likely to support it than other religious groups, make up about 25 percent
of the population in Nebraska and the country.
Finally, Nebraska lawmakers have not introduced religious freedom legislation. This means that survey respondents answered questions about a hypothetical scenario or
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one they may have observed on the news from other states
rather than events affecting their neighbors or fellow citizens. This allows us to understand how narratives about religious freedom that draw from ideas about freedom and
democracy operate ideologically (Bonikowski and DiMaggio
2016; Thomas and Whitehead 2015). As Laurel Westbrook
and Kristen Schilt (2014) argued, especially when it comes
to cotemporary debates over LGBTQ rights, definitions of
sex, gender, and sexuality operate at an imaginary level,
whereby individuals draw from suppositional ideas and
hypothetical scenes, rather than specific evidence or experience. The data we analyze include open-ended survey data,
which allow us to examine the underlying logic people have
regarding their views on religious freedom laws.

Methods
Data
Our data come from the 2015 Nebraska Annual Social
Indicators Survey (NASIS). NASIS is an annual, cross-sectional, omnibus survey of Nebraska adults ages 19 and older,
which is conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research
at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. The 2015 NASIS
was a mail survey sent to randomly selected address-based
sample of 3,500 Nebraska households that was provided by
Survey Sampling International. Respondents were selected
within sampled households using the next-birthday technique. Data collection consisted of three mailings (initial survey packet with a $1 cash incentive, postcard reminder, and
a replacement survey packet) sent between August 12, 2015,
and October 20, 2015 (NASIS 2014–2015 Methodology
Report). A total of 1,143 respondents completed NASIS
2015, for a response rate of 32.7 percent (American
Association for Public Opinion Research Response Rate 1;
American Association for Public Opinion Research 2009).
NASIS data have the advantage of not only quantitatively
measuring people’s views on religious freedom laws but also
including data on how people justify their views. Because
our aim is to examine how people justify their view through
open-ended responses, we do not weight the NASIS data to
generalize to Nebraska’s adult population. Rather, we generalize findings to the sample of NASIS respondents. Table 1
displays the demographic, political, and religious makeup of
the completed NASIS 2015 sample and displays the
unweighted respondent characteristics from Pew’s national
sample, which we use as a national comparison (Pew
Research Center 2016d). The distributions show that NASIS
respondents were more likely to be female, religious, and
Republican but also less racially and ethnically diverse.

Measures
We focus our analyses on the NASIS 2015 questions asking
about respondents’ views of religious freedom laws (see

Table 1. NASIS and Pew Research Center Respondent
Demographic, Political, and Religious Characteristics.
Variable
Gender
Male
Female
Sexual orientation
Heterosexual/straight
Gay or lesbian
Bisexual
Something else
Unsure
Know LGB person
Yes
No
Race
White
Nonwhite/multirace
Hispanic
Yes
No
Age (mean)
Education
Less than high school
High school
Some college
BA or higher
Political party
Democratic
Republican
Independent
Other
Political ideology
Very liberal
Liberal
Middle of the road
Conservative
Very conservative
Other
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Muslim
None
Other
Born-again Christian
Yes
No
Religious attendance
Several times a week
Once a week
Nearly every week
About once a month

NASIS (%)

Pew Research
Center (%)

40.22
59.78

52.35
47.65

97.25
1.01
0.92
0.18
0.64

—
—
—
—
—

49.32
50.68

—
—

86.26
13.74

77.04
22.96

2.94
97.06
60

10.86
89.14
53

2.43
17.27
22.5
57.8

6.98
25.25
26
41.77

28.52
43.88
24.01
3.59

32.34
27.41
37.21
3.05

3.67
15.5
39.27
29.82
9.08
2.66

7.3
15.89
35.89
32.13
9.2
—

55.65
28.7
0.37
0.19
13.24
1.85

52.59
20.3
1.68
0.96
6.9
17.56

28.48
71.52

43.54
56.46

6.25
27.41
11.52
8.84

14.96
24.69
13
(continued)

6

Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 

Table 1. (continued)
Variable
Several time a year
About once a year
Less than once a year
Never
Religious influence
Very much
Quite a bit
Some
A little
None
Not religious

NASIS (%)

Pew Research
Center (%)

16.16
8.3
8.93
12.59

17.83
16.73

33.81
29.89
18.51
8.19
4.98
4.63

—
—
—
—
—
—

12.8

Note: NASIS = Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey.

Table 2). The first question asked respondents whether they
favor or oppose laws that allow business owners to deny services to gay men or lesbians on the basis of the owners’ religious beliefs. The second is an open-ended question, which
immediately followed the first question, asking respondents
why they favored or opposed such laws. A total of 1,117
respondents (97.73 percent) answered the closed-ended,
favor/oppose question, and 838 respondents (73.32 percent
of all respondents and 75.02 percent of those who answered
the closed-ended question) elaborated on their opinion by
writing responses to the open-ended question. Responses
were typically brief (one to two sentences) but capture the
shared frameworks or cultural schemas that are available to
people as they make sense of religious freedom debates
(Blair-Loy 2001).

Analysis
We used an explanatory mixed-methods approach (Creswell
and Plano Clark 2011) to examine and explore respondents’
views of religious freedom laws. First, we analyzed the percentages of NASIS respondents who favored and opposed
religious freedom laws. Using χ2 tests, we examined how
NASIS respondents’ views differ by demographic, political,
and religious characteristics, and we compared these findings with how opinion of religious freedom laws varies by
these characteristics among national data from the Pew
Research Center (2014).
Our next set of analyses centered on the qualitative data.
Qualitative analysis allows us to move beyond the quantitative
outcomes of “favor versus oppose” to hear from respondents
about how they contextualize their views on a complex issue
implicated by religious freedom laws. Qualitative coding of
the open-ended responses was iterative. First, all three authors
read the open-ended responses, and each author generated an
initial list of codes that emerged from the data (Crabtree and
Miller 1992). Second, we cross-checked provisional codes

Table 2. Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey Question
Wording.
Question
Do you favor or oppose laws that allow
business owners to deny services
to gay men or lesbians based on the
owner’s religious beliefs?
Why do you favor or oppose laws
that allow business owners to deny
services to gay men or lesbians based
on the owner’s religious beliefs?

Response Option
Favor, oppose

Open-ended text box

and discussed common themes. These provisional codes
became the basis for axial coding, which tested the relationships among emerging categories and confirmed whether
these themes continued to emerge from the data (Corbin and
Strauss 1990). Initially, using the coding structure, two
research assistants coded an initial set of 50 responses. The
authors and research assistants then met to resolve all inconsistent codes between the two coders. The research assistants
coded the remaining qualitative responses, while meeting with
the first author to discuss coding decisions and maintain
consistency.
The coding structure was an iterative hierarchy of themes
(Figure 1), with parent, child, and grandchild codes. The parent codes included: “rights” (references to a person’s or
group’s “right,” either explicitly or implicitly), universal truth
(declarations that draw from broad ideas about the nature of
the world or humankind), “free market” (references to capitalism or the economic system), and sexuality irrelevant
(claims that sexuality or sexual orientation does not or should
not matter in business contexts). The parent codes represented
higher level ideas respondents drew on in contextualizing
their views of religious freedom laws. The child codes further
characterize the ideas within each parent code. The child and
grandchild codes offer more nuance in how respondents used
the logic (i.e., parent code) in their responses. For instance,
for the “rights” parent code, the child codes identify whether
the respondent used the logic of “rights” related to business
owners or customers. We then noted whether the respondents
who used business owner’s rights focused their responses
specifically on a business owner’s religious beliefs or rights
nonspecific to religion. Similarly, we noted whether respondents who used customer’s rights made explicit reference to
gay or lesbian persons or to customers generally.
In the following section, we first report the frequency of
each parent code in the data.4 “Quantitizing” the qualitative
4Some

quotations did not fit into the coding scheme reported in this
article. The themes in these quotations either occurred at such low
frequencies that they did not warrant their own codes or showed
that the respondents did not understand the topic of the question.
For example, some respondents appeared to interpret the question
as asking about the ability to hire or fire an employee on the basis
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Figure 1. Coding structure for open-ended responses.

data shows how often each code appeared in the data
(Driscoll et al. 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). We used
χ2 tests to examine which types of respondents (demographic,
political, and religious characteristics) used which logic to
contextualize their views on religious freedom laws. Finally,
we explored how respondents used logics to justify both
favoring and opposing religious freedom laws. Because we
are most interested in how the same cultural schemas can be
used to reach different conclusion, in this analysis we focus
on the only two parent codes that were used nearly evenly by
respondents on both sides of the issue: rights and free market. We used direct quotes from respondents to illustrate how
respondents articulated their views.

Limitations
NASIS data are not generalizable to the U.S. population; we
cannot assume that our data resemble national opinion,
though some evidence suggests that our results may be comparable. For example, 32 percent of respondents in a 2017
PRRI national survey reported that “small businesses should
be able to refuse to provide services to gay and lesbian people
on religious grounds,” compared with 36 percent of NASIS
respondents, and 56 percent of white evangelicals held this
view in the PRRI survey compared with 52 percent of white
evangelical NASIS respondents (Cox and Jones 2017).5
Another limitation of our data is that the survey asks only a
single question related to religious freedom legislation. There
are additional topics legislated in religious freedom bills that
of sexual orientation. Other respondents wrote explanations of their
views on same-sex marriage. We excluded these exceptions from
the analyses.
5Question wording from the PRRI survey was the most comparable
with our survey, but a data embargo until 2018 prohibits us from
running analyses to draw further comparisons with our data. For
this reason, we use national data from the Pew Research Center
(2016d) for comparisons.

our data do not address, including transgender people using
public restrooms, employers being required to provide birth
control, same-sex couples accessing fertility treatments, or
religious leaders being required to recognize same-sex marriage (all topics legislated in religious freedom bills). Given
that bills proposed in states do not share common language, it
is difficult for a single survey to capture public opinion on the
issue of “religious freedom” as a whole. Yet because religious
freedom legislation has implications beyond wedding-related
services, surveys should attempt to capture the public’s opinion on a range of issues. In a related vein, our survey was
conducted very shortly after the Obergefell v. Hodges decision. Future work should track whether the public’s attitudes
change as more legislation is introduced or passed and as
more cases are publicized.

Findings
Views on Religious Freedom Laws
Among the NASIS respondents, 36.31 percent favored
religious freedom laws, and 63.69 percent opposed them.6
6Our initial results indicated that 35.35 percent favored religious
freedom laws and that 64.55 percent opposed religious freedom
laws. Coding the open-ended responses, however, revealed 18
respondents who we believe mismarked their responses to the
closed-ended item (e.g., respondents marking that they oppose religious freedom laws but writing that they support laws that allow
business owners to deny services to gay men and lesbians). Thus,
we created a measure that corrected these inconsistent responses.
Because there was a less than 1 percentage point difference between
the original and corrected measure, we use the corrected measure
for the remaining analyses. The distributions were also similar
to weighted analyses, which showed 63.67 percent opposing and
36.33 percent favoring religious freedom laws among the original
variable and 62.97 percent opposing and 37.03 percent favoring
religious freedom laws among the corrected variable.
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In comparison, national data from the Pew Research Center
(2016d) show that 52.32 percent of the Pew survey respondents think that businesses providing wedding-related services, such as catering or flowers, should be allowed to refuse
services to same-sex couples, whereas 47.68 percent reported
that businesses should be required to provide wedding-related
services. Similarly, analyses from a national experimental
survey reveal that 53 percent of Americans believe that a photographer should be able to refuse services to a same-sex
couple (Powell et al. 2017). We anticipated that results from
surveys that asked specifically about “wedding-related services” would be more closely divided than NASIS data
because those questions emphasizes the contested topic of
marriage. The NASIS data show that when asking about businesses generally, the result is fewer people favoring religious
freedom laws (see also Cox and Jones 2017).
Chi-square analyses, nonetheless, show similar significant differences in views of religious freedom laws by demographic, political, and religious characteristics for both
NASIS and Pew data (Table 3). Both data sets show significant differences in views of religious freedom laws by gender, political party, political ideology, religious affiliation,
born-again Christian identity, and religious attendance.
These characteristics are all associated with views of religious freedom laws in similar ways as other LGB policies
(Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005;
Lewis 2011; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson et al. 2006;
Pearl and Galupo 2007; Rowatt et al. 2009; Sherkat et al.
2010; Swank et al. 2013; Whitehead 2010; Woodford et al.
2012). For example, 46.35 percent men favor religious freedom laws compared with 29.76 percent of women in NASIS,
χ2(1) = 30.9474, p < .001), and 57.04 percent of men and
47.26 percent of women favor religious freedom laws in the
Pew data, χ2(1) = 17.9394, p < .001). Furthermore, Democrats,
liberals, and nonreligious respondents are more likely to
oppose religious freedom laws. Interestingly, unlike in analyses of views of other LGB issues, such as same-sex marriage, views of religious freedom laws did not significantly
differ by respondent education level in the NASIS data, χ2(5)
= 4.2979, p = .507, or Pew data, χ2(7) = 7.0072, p = .428.
In addition, NASIS included respondent characteristics
not measured in the Pew survey, including respondent sexual orientation and whether the respondent knows an LGB
person. Unsurprisingly, LGB respondents almost unanimously opposed religious freedom laws, χ2(4) = 13.5394, p
= .009, and respondents who know an LGB person were
significantly more likely to oppose religious freedom laws
than those who do not know an LGB person, χ2(1) =
21.2502, p < .001).

Logics Used for Views
Table 4 displays the frequency and percentage that each
qualitative code characterized the logic used in responses to
the question asking respondents why they hold their views
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on religious freedom laws and the breakdown in support for
religious freedom laws by each type of logic. (See Figure 1
for an illustration of the full coding hierarchy.) Note that the
codes are not mutually exclusive; some responses were characterized by more than one type of logic, such as making
both a rights and a sexuality-irrelevant argument. A little
over half of responses (59 percent) included a rights-based
argument, with the next most frequent logic used being universal truth, at 26 percent of the responses. Free market and
sexuality irrelevant responses were the least frequent, at 9
percent and 11 percent, respectively.
As seen in Table 4, support for religious freedom laws
was highest among respondents who used “free market”
logic in their responses, with 57 percent of those respondents
favoring the laws. This is followed closely by the “rights”
logic code, with 54 percent of those respondents favoring the
laws. Support for religious freedom laws was lowest among
those respondents using “sexuality irrelevant” logic (7 percent) and for those using “universal truth” logic (16 percent).
Below we present qualitative analysis on the “free market”
and “rights” codes because these were the logics shared by
respondents with opposing views.
As reported in Table 5, χ2 analyses showed few consistent demographic, political, and religious trends in what
types of respondents used the various logics. The respondents who justified their views on religious freedom laws
by drawing on rights-based logic were more likely to know
an LGB person, have higher education levels, and more
likely to identify as a Republican and as politically conservative. Whether the response drew on rights logic versus
another type of logic did not significantly differ by other
respondent demographic and religious characteristics. The
only demographic characteristic that significantly differed
for the free market code was that the respondents employing that logic were significantly more likely to report knowing an LGB person.

Different Sides, Same Logic: Rights and the Free
Market
Both sides rely on two logics that are foundational to the
American experience: the protection of rights and the capitalist economy. People who favor the rights of business
owners to deny services to gay men and lesbians relied
almost exclusively on these two logics. Although responses
from those who oppose the rights of business owners to
deny services to gay men and lesbians were more varied,
these responses also relied heavily on “rights” and the “free
market” to justify their position. That both sides used the
cultural schemas of rights and free market, but reached different conclusions, points to disagreements not over the
value of freedom or equality per se but rather over the questions of whose rights are most worthy of protection and
whose freedom is potentially jeopardized in the current
moment.
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Table 3. Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Respondent Characteristics, NASIS and Pew.
NASIS

Pew Research Center
χ2

Gender
Male
Female
Sexual orientation
Heterosexual/straight
Gay or lesbian
Bisexual
Something else
Unsure
Know LGB person
Yes
No
Race
White
Nonwhite/multirace
Hispanic
Yes
No
Age (mean)
Education
Less than high school
High school
Some college
BA or higher
Political party
Democratic
Republican
Independent
Other
Political ideology
Very liberal
Liberal
Middle of the road
Conservative
Very conservative
Other
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Muslim
None
Other
Born-again Christian
Yes
No
Religious attendance
Several times a week
Once a week

Favor (%)

Oppose (%)

46.35
29.77

53.65
70.23

37.48
0
0
50
14.29

(p Value)

χ2
Favor (%)

Oppose (%)

(p Value)

30.95
(<.001)

56.94
47.26

43.06
52.74

62.52
100
100
50
85.71

13.54
(.009)

—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—

—

29.72
43.22

70.28
56.78

21.25
(<.001)

—
—

—
—

—

37.37
29.17

62.63
70.83

4.84
(.304)

55.84
40.42

44.16
59.58

40.42
(<.001)

22.58
37.14

77.42
62.86

2.75
(.097)

40.2
53.76

59.8
46.24

13.12
(<.001)

28
35.91
39.74
34.2

72
64.09
60.26
65.8

4.3
(.507)

46.09
51.58
51.1
54.31

53.91
48.42
48.9
45.69

7.07
–0.428

15.36
53.93
31.52
24.32

84.64
46.07
68.48
75.68

125.83
(<.001)

34.53
73.75
51.29
57.41

65.47
26.25
48.71
42.59

174.03
(<.001)

7.5
13.1
24.94
55.94
77.32
28.57

92.5
86.9
75.06
44.06
22.68
71.43

201.15
(<.001)

28.26
31.88
45.86
68.48
76.57
—

71.74
68.12
54.14
31.52
23.43
—

197.6
(<.001)

44.07
35.29
0
0
13.99
21.05

55.93
64.71
100
100
86.01
78.95

51.19
(<.001)

61.65
44.68
31.25
27.78
35.88
42.25

38.35
55.32
68.75
72.22
64.12
57.75

81.21
(<.001)

52.53
30.7

47.47
69.3

43.46
(<.001)

65.28
51.41

34.72
48.59

26.79
(<.001)

66.18
45.67

33.82
54.33

81.39
(<.001)

71.89
60.93

28.11
39.07

99.96
(<.001)

17.94
(<.001)

(continued)
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Table 3. (continued)
NASIS

Pew Research Center
χ2

Nearly every week
About once a month
Several time a year
About once a year
Less than once a year
Never
Religious influence
Very much
Quite a bit
Some
A little
None
Not religious

Favor (%)

Oppose (%)

48.8
32.65
30.39
20.88
26.8
18.57

51.2
67.35
69.61
79.12
73.2
81.43

48.65
41.52
24.76
24.18
12.73
11.54

51.35
58.48
75.24
75.82
87.27
88.46

(p Value)

72.75
(<.001)

χ2
Favor (%)

Oppose (%)

48.22

51.78

40.3
48.6

59.7
51.4

37.92

62.08

—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—
—

(p Value)

—

Note: NASIS = Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey.

Table 4. Logic Used in Response to Open-ended Question and Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Logic.
Religious Freedom Laws (%)
Code
Rights
Universal truth
Free market
Sexuality irrelevant

Frequency

Percentage

Favor

Oppose

491
217
75
95

59
26
9
11

54
16
57
7

46
84
43
93

Note: N = 1,143 total respondents and n = 838 respondents who answered the open-ended question. We coded 58 responses that drew on other
themes, but at low frequencies, as “other.”

Rights. Respondents who used a “rights” logic shared the
idea that Americans have a fundamental right to live their
lives freely. For those who opposed religious freedom laws,
this meant a focus on an individual’s right to be free from
discrimination. For those who support religious freedom
laws, this meant a focus on an individual’s right to be free
from government control and freedom to act in ways that
uphold their religious convictions.
Some respondents who used a “rights” logic interpreted a
law that would allow a business owner to deny services to
gay men or lesbians on the basis of their religious belief to be
codifying discrimination against people on the basis of sexual orientation. Their responses foregrounded issues of fairness and equality. As one person commented, “It is a civil
right for all Americans to be treated fairly.” Another noted,
“Government supported discrimination on any basis is
wrong.” This sentiment echoed what others said, including:
“I am against all forms of discrimination”; “Business owners
cannot refuse service to a specific group”; “I oppose laws
because it can be used as an excuse to discriminate”; and

“Everyone should have same access to services despite the
service provider’s personal beliefs. Otherwise, it would be
blatant discrimination.” Religious freedom bills are discriminatory against gay men and lesbians, according to these
respondents, and antithetical to their belief that gays and lesbians have the right to be treated equally and to not face
discrimination.
Many people drew a parallel to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation with forms of discrimination that
Americans widely oppose (Pew Research Center 2016b).
The following comment is exemplary of respondents who
made reference to racial discrimination: “It is discriminatory! We may as well allow people to refuse service to people
of other races.” Similarly, another person explained that they
opposed laws that would allow business owners to deny services “because businesses discriminating against LGBT people is no different than half a century ago when businesses
discriminated against blacks. Supporting civil rights means
everyone gets to sit at the lunch counter.” Some also made
the comparison with discrimination on the basis of religion.
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Table 5. Percentage of Respondents Using Rights Logic to Explain Their Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Respondent
Characteristics.
Rights Logic

Free Market
χ2

Gender
Male
Female
Know LGB person
Yes
No
Education
High school or less
Some college
BA or higher
Political party
Democratic
Republican
Independent
Other
Political ideology
Very liberal
Liberal
Middle of the road
Conservative
Very conservative
Other
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Muslim
None
Other
Born-again Christian
Yes
No
Religious attendance
Several times a week
Once a week
Nearly every week
About once a month
Several time a year
About once a year
Less than once a year
Never
Religious influence
Very much
Quite a bit
Some
A little
None
Not religious

χ2

Yes (%)

No (%)

(p Value)

Yes (%)

No (%)

(p Value)

43.44
43.99

56.56
56.01

0.0323
(.857)

7.01
6.54

92.99
93.46

0.0924
(.761)

47.13
40.47

52.87
59.53

4.9528
(.026)

9.06
4.32

90.94
95.68

9.9209
(.002)

27.96
39.39
53.94

72.04
60.61
46.06

44.2334
<.001

3.79
7.67
7.68

96.21
92.33
92.32

3.9716
.137

40.97
47.17
42.53
35.90

59.03
52.83
57.47
64.10

4.3667
(.224)

5.16
6.71
9.20
5.13

94.84
93.29
90.80
94.87

3.8507
(.278)

37.50
44.38
36.45
51.69
53.54
44.83

62.50
55.62
63.55
48.31
46.46
55.17

22.0622
(<.001)

7.5
4.73
4.91
8.62
11.11
6.9

92.5
95.27
95.09
91.38
88.89
93.1

8.2824
(.141)

48.09
39.03
25.00
50.00
40.56
30.00

51.91
60.97
75.00
50.00
59.44
70.00

10.0652
(.073)

6.82
6.77
0
0
6.29
5.00

93.18
93.23
100
100
93.71
95.00

0.5789
(.989)

42.86
44.71

57.14
55.29

0.2994
(.584)

7.31
6.75

92.69
93.25

0.1061
(.745)

54.29
40.07
51.16
40.40
40.33
40.86
50.00
41.84

45.71
59.93
48.84
59.60
59.67
59.14
50.00
58.16

11.1354
(.133)

7.14
6.19
6.2
3.03
8.29
7.53
5.00
8.51

92.86
93.81
93.8
96.97
91.71
92.47
95.00
91.49

4.4086
(.732)

46.58
39.58
41.83
46.74
42.86
46.15

53.42
60.42
58.17
53.26
57.14
53.85

4.3497
(.500)

5.26
6.55
7.21
9.78
12.5
1.92

94.74
93.45
92.79
90.22
87.5
98.08

7.7659
(.170)
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For instance, people made comments such as “I don’t believe
services should be denied based on sexual preference or religious beliefs.” Another comment underscores the logic that a
diverse America necessitates the need to protect individual
freedom: “every one has the right to any service gay, straight,
jewish [sic], yellow, green.” According to this logic,
Americans should expect to be free from discrimination:
sexual orientation, like race, religion, or other aspects of
individual identity, should not be grounds to treat people
unequally.
On the other side, supporters of religious freedom laws
focused on the rights of business owners to be free to make
their own decisions on whom to serve. Here respondents
emphasized a general freedom belonging to business owners
(as opposed to a specific right belonging to business owners
as we outline below). This freedom to make decisions about
whom to serve was not necessarily tied to the business owner’s religious beliefs, but connected to the general rights of
owning and operating a business. According to one comment: “Whether you agree or disagree with a business owner’s policies, if they own it, they can do what they want.
Doesn’t mean its right/wrong.” Another respondent
responded more aggressively: “I’m tired of this being shoved
down our throat. A business should have the right to serve or
not [serve] anyone they want to.” Several respondents referenced a sign common to storefronts, “No shoes, no shirt- no
service!” One respondent added, “Business owners have
been doing this for years.” As these comments illustrate,
people using this logic interpreted the potential for business
owners to refuse service to a gay or lesbian person as an
extension of other forms of decisions that business owners
could make in terms of providing service, such as denying
service to someone not wearing a shirt or shoes. Respondents
privileged business owners’ ability to make decisions independent from what they viewed as governmental interference; as one person remarked, “I think government should
stay out of it.” This logic was akin to the discrimination justification outlined earlier in that it was a blanket sort of logic:
people should be free from all forms of discrimination in the
same way that business owners should be free from regulation of any kind.
Many respondents emphasized not only that business
owners should have the right to refuse service for any reason
but also specifically that business owners should have the
right to make decisions that support their religious beliefs.
Here respondents emphasized the First Amendment and the
protection of religious freedom for all Americans. Some
illustrative comments include “1st Amendment of US
Constitution: Right to free exercise of religion (not just
thought)” and “protection of the First Amendment” and
“Owners should not be forced to go against their religious
beliefs that should be guaranteed under the Constitution.” As
these quotations illustrate, some respondents characterized
religious freedom laws as necessary reiterations of the existing constitutional right of business owners. For instance, one
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respondent commented, “the constitution states that we, as
US citizens have freedom of religion. If we must provide
services to gays or face legal penalties, this is denying us the
freedom to practice our faith.” According to respondents
such as this one, religious freedom laws are necessary in the
wake of marriage equality and expanding LGBT rights
because some business owners have religious objections to
homosexuality and same-sex marriage.
Other respondents did not invoke the Constitution or First
Amendment explicitly but nonetheless pointed to business
owners’ right to practice their religious beliefs. For instance,
respondents wrote comments such as “no private business
owner should be compelled to do things against their religion”;
“Because of the persons [sic] religious beliefs should take precedent [sic]”; “As a business owner you should not have to do
something against your religious beliefs!!!”; “I believe this
country was founded because our fore fathers believed in the
right to practice our religion without persecution by the government”; and “owner of business should be able to conduct business in accordance with his religious convictions—to be true to
himself. He owns the business!” These comments further
underscore that support of religious freedom laws centers on
their belief that without such laws, business owners’ rights to
practice their religion are infringed upon.
Both sides create parallels between social identity categories (e.g., being gay and being black, being Christian and
being gay) to justify their positions on the basis of the overarching theme of individual freedom. As one respondent who
opposes religious freedom laws wrote, “I oppose because I
don’t want someone’s religious beliefs to determine how I or
my family live our lives. Why are their beliefs more important than mine?” This statement is remarkably similar to one
written by a respondent who supports religious freedom laws:
“No one (either side) should be forced to do something they
don’t believe in, that makes them very uncomfortable.” This
call to the rights of “either side” emphasizes the shared cultural schema among those with different perspectives on religious freedom laws. Despite using similar schema,
respondents nonetheless reach different conclusions about
these laws, an implication that we return to in the discussion.
The Free Market. Our data find a “free market” logic to be
less common than the “rights” logic to support or oppose
religious freedom laws. For those who use a “free market”
logic, 56 percent favored a business owner’s right to refuse
service to gay men and lesbians (see Table 4). A significant
portion of “free market” responses, however, used this logic
to oppose religious freedom laws. The “free market” code
captures any reference to the capitalist economy, particularly
the motivation and risk of generating profit that accompanies
running a business. For those who support religious freedom
laws, this generally meant respondents who justified their
position by arguing that gay and lesbian customers in the free
market economy can choose an alternative business if one
business owner refuses to serve them. For those who oppose

13

Kazyak et al.
religious freedom laws using this logic, they emphasized that
business owners should not let morals or values get in the
way of the primary purpose of business: generating a profit.
Respondents who favored religious freedom laws using a
“free market” logic painted a picture of an economy full of
choices for customers. Their responses suggested that there
are many businesses willing to serve gay men and lesbians
and that gay men and lesbians should frequent those businesses. One illustrative example comes from a respondent
who writes, “the issue is not denial of service, it is exercise
of conscience. The ‘services’ are readily available elsewhere.” This respondent makes explicit what was implicit in
most other responses using a similar logic: that the abundance of American businesses means that gay men and lesbians are not harmed if they are not able to receive services
from one or a few that refuse to serve them. As other
responses indicate, “They [gay men and lesbians] have
plenty of other option[s]”; “There are plenty of gay-friendly
businesses”; and “Business owners should be able to run
their businesses as they want and not be controlled by the
government. If gays don’t like it they can buy their things
other place[s].” Sentiments like these are somewhat surprising coming from our sample, as Nebraska has a significant
rural population where choice in businesses tends to be limited. Yet these responses mirror a neoliberal logic, imagining
the economy as diverse, vast, and accessible to all Americans
(Amable 2011). In tandem with a “rights” logic supporting
business owners who deny services to gay men and lesbians,
respondents using a “free market” logic implied that religious freedom laws do not actually harm gay men and lesbians. Instead, the “harm” at stake in religious freedom debates
is over the protection of religious people who operate their
businesses in a free market.
Respondents who oppose religious freedom laws using a
“free market” logic suggest that the American economy is,
by its nature, objective and nondiscriminatory, and to get in
the way of this “free market” process (understood here as not
doing business with gay men and lesbians) is to get in the
way of capitalist American values. One respondent calls it a
“bad business decision” for a business owner to refuse service and potential profit from certain “law abiding citizens”
and goes on to state, “I think the government should stay out
of it. It’s called natural consequences.” Although many
respondents emphasized negative outcomes for actual businesses (as we describe below), other comments focused
more broadly on the ideology of the free market. These
respondents wrote comments such as “Commerce is a privilege to serve the public. All the public” and “there should be
a distinct separation between religion and commerce. If there
is demand, it would kill a capitalist society.” For respondents
who oppose religious freedom laws, the “free market” underscores the democracy and equality that is foundational to
America, including its economy.
Many respondents using this logic emphasized that customer identity is less important than the money they spend

and that business owners should be concerned only with the
latter. As one respondent put it, “money all spends the same.”
Other comments echo this belief that business owners should
not refuse service of to anyone: “the idea of business is to
make money. To refuse a money making transaction is stupid” and “as a business owner, you don’t turn away business.” Some respondents pointed to the negative
consequences of withholding services to a certain population, like one respondent who believed it would have a negative effect on the businesses themselves: “I think those biz
[businesses] owner’s will fail with that way of thinking and
doing biz [business].” Responses like these combined a logic
of “rights” (freedom from discrimination) and the “free market” to oppose the protection of business owners who choose
to refuse services to gay men and lesbians.
In sum, the logic of “free market” was used by both
respondents who supported and opposed religious freedom
law. However, their comments underscore diverging viewpoints with regard to whose actions and decisions within the
capitalist economy are salient. For respondents who favor the
laws, the focus is on the decision of gay and lesbian customers (i.e., they can go elsewhere). In contrast, those who oppose
the laws focus on the decision of the business owner (i.e., they
are making a bad business decision). What these positions
have in common, though, is a clear product of neoliberal ideology: that social conflicts and divisions can (and should) be
adjudicated by the free market. On both sides of the debate,
this logic uses the guise of economic forces to obscure other
solutions to persistent inequalities (Duggan 2004).

Discussion and Conclusion
Religious freedom laws may be the current “battleground”
over LGBTQ rights, and some argue that their passage in 25
states (as of June 2017) represents a backlash to increased
acceptance of LGBTQ people (Corvino et al. 2017). Yet our
findings suggest that the introduction and passage of these
laws may not reflect broad support. Using Nebraska as a case
study, we find that a clear majority (64 percent) opposes laws
that allow business owners to deny services to gay men or
lesbians on the basis of the owners’ religious beliefs. The fact
that support for religious freedom laws is at only 36 percent
in Nebraska is particularly interesting given that Nebraska is
seen as a red state, and more of its citizens identify as
Republicans compared to national averages (Saad 2013).
Despite its leaning more conservative in terms of political
ideology, Nebraska is comparable with the national average
in terms of both public opinion on LGBTQ rights and religiosity (Pew Research Center 2014; Stange and Kazyak 2016).
Thus, treating Nebraskans’ public opinion as a case study is
instructive in terms of public opinion about religious freedom laws.
Our work highlights the overlap in the logics used and the
saliency of the cultural schemas of rights, discrimination,
freedom, and capitalism as people make sense of religious
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freedom laws that directly reference sexual minorities.
Despite using similar frameworks of rights, respondents who
used this language reached very different conclusions about
whose rights (and which rights) should be protected and who
faces potential harm. Specifically, respondents who oppose
religious freedom laws view gay men and lesbians as a group
facing potential mistreatment and therefore as a group in
need of protection. According to their logic, gay and lesbian
individuals are like other marginalized groups, including
African Americans, whose civil rights either have been or
have the potential to be infringed upon because of social
prejudices. Respondents view religious freedom legislation
as threatening the freedom of gay men and lesbians to fully
participate in public life. In contrast, people who favor religious freedom laws view business owners as potentially
harmed if they are unable to exercise their religion in making
business decisions. These respondents view the right to practice one’s religion as paramount and, for conservative
Christians, under threat in light of the advancement of
LGBTQ rights, particularly same-sex marriage. Thus, they
see religious freedom bills as necessary to protect the rights
of Christian business owners.
When both sides rely on American values related to freedom while describing different groups whose rights or interests are in jeopardy, it may appear as if the two opposing
sides share equal footing within American life and law. This
is bolstered by cultural schemas emphasizing equality and
the belief that no one should be discriminated against, in
addition to the impersonal and objective capitalist free market. Such schemas, however, obscure historic and persistent
inequalities across groups (Brown 2006). Specifically, gays
and lesbians have faced obstacles to being fully visible and
accepted within American society in ways that Christians
have not (Canady 2009; Parker and Barreto 2013). Gays and
lesbians, as well as non-Christians, face discrimination that
does not affect their heterosexual or Christian counterparts
(Mishel 2016; Schilt 2008). Researchers examining employment discrimination on religious grounds, for example, find
that Muslims, pagans, and atheists are more likely to face
discrimination compared with other religious groups and
nonreligious people (Wallace, Wright, and Hyde 2014;
Wright et al. 2013). Additionally, federal and state laws protect people from discrimination on the basis of religion in all
50 states, and in contrast, there is no federal protection for
people on the basis of sexual orientation, and only 20 states
offer such protection (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 2018). Taken together these pieces of evidence
illustrate the ways in which religion and sexuality are key
boundary makers (Burke 2016; Edgell et al. 2016; Edgell
and Tranby 2010; Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink 1999).
Nonetheless, some evangelical Christians perceive themselves to be under threat in the current moment. According to
data from the Pew Research Center (2016c), 41 percent of this
group reported that it is difficult to be an evangelical Christian
in America. Likewise, a majority of white evangelicals (61
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percent) believe that religious liberty is threatened in America
(Cox and Jones 2012). Thus, the emphasis on rights and equality may be an intentional strategy of conservative religious
activists to emphasize perceived oppression and persecution
of the conservative Christians within America in an era of
increasing visibility and acceptance of LGBTQ people.
Whereas these activists had once used the framework of “special rights” to protest advancement of LGBTQ rights (i.e., that
gays and lesbians were a minority group advocating for rights
that went above and beyond what the rest of Americans had),
it may be that the new conceptualization of Christians as a
religious group under threat will hold more sway with some
Americans.
Interestingly, respondents on both sides of this debate
who use a “free market” logic to justify their position focus
on the opposite group from their counterparts exclusively
using a “rights” logic. For proponents of religious freedom
laws, a free market rationale emphasizes that gay men and
lesbians are not harmed as a result of religious freedom bills.
According to them, even though gay men and lesbians may
encounter a business owner who will not serve them, gays
and lesbians are not harmed because the free market provides
ample business options for them to pursue. Yet on the other
side, respondents draw on understandings about capitalism
to posit that business owners would be harmed by religious
freedom bills because denying service to a group of potential
customers would in fact be detrimental to business profits
and contrary to the philosophy of the free market.
Furthermore, that both those who support and oppose religious freedom legislation draw on the cultural schema of
“free market” indicates the degree to which neoliberalism has
infused how Americans make sense of social issues and may
be a side effect of an increasingly corporate-sponsored gay
rights movements (Duggan 2004; Ghaziani 2008; Ward
2008). The free market and capitalism are seen as arbiters of
justice, ensuring both that business owners who would discriminate against gays and lesbians would suffer appropriate
consequences (according to those who oppose legislation)
and that gays and lesbians would have ample outlets to secure
whatever provisions they were seeking (according to those
who support legislation). Supporters of religious freedom
laws who focus on business owners’ rights showcases the
value they place on business and capitalism. This may explain
why researchers recently found that 53 percent of Americans
support a business owner denying services to a gay couple,
regardless of whether the reason for denying service was
because of the business owner’s religious beliefs (Powell
et al. 2017). Indeed, we also found that not all people who
support religious freedom legislation specifically mentioned
the need to protect religious freedom in their justification.
Moreover, that those who oppose religious freedom legislation likewise upheld neoliberalism and championed the
framework of the free market mirrors the strategy used by
some LGBTQ rights organizations. For instance, groups such
as the Human Rights Campaign put out an equality index that
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ranks businesses and corporations on how LGBTQ friendly
they are using a range of measures. Our findings support the
observation that Americans may increasingly look to nongovernmental interventions, such as the free market, to adjudicate
matters of discrimination and equality with regard to religious
freedom (see Duggan 2004; Levitsky 2014).
Ultimately, the fact that people on both sides of the
debates over religious freedom laws appeal to frameworks
that resonate with nearly all Americans to justify their position underscores why these bills will likely continue to be
introduced, debated, and seen as controversial, despite the
fact that polling data suggests that a majority of Americans
may actually be opposed to some of what such bills codify
into law.
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